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In this supplementary file we present further predictions and explore additional tests of the 
connection between coups, civil war risk, accountability avoidance, and the presence of pro-
government militias. We argued in the main paper that based on pre-existing research, semi-
official militias that are outside of the regular military chain-of-command but with a visible link 
to the government will be most likely to be used for coup-proofing. However, it is possible that 
governments may also utilize irregular militias to coup-proof that are not obviously tied to the 
government. These more informal militias are also coded in our underlying data. Therefore, we 
re-analyze six models from the main paper using a new indicator that includes both semi-official 
and informal militia linkages in a state as the dependent variable. These results can be found in 
Table A1 and A2.  
 The inferences from these models remain consistent with our conclusions in the text. 
Coup risk in isolation (Model 2.1 and Model 2.2) aids in predicting the presence of militias, but 
there is room for improvement. The addition of civil war risk and accountability avoidance 
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indicators (Models 2.3 and 2.4) provide a meaningful boost in predictive capacity for the model 
both in-sample and out-of sample. Table A2 illustrates that the disaggregated model also 
continues to be the preferred model when compared to the others as we present in the main text. 
The same development puzzle highlighted in the main text continues to exist in these data.  
We also investigated whether dropping states that only had informal militias from our 
sample altered our results. Since this changes our sample we can no longer compare AIC values. 
However, the inferences from the coefficients in Table A3 are again consistent. 
In Figure A1 we analyze what observations are both predicted and surprising given our 
best-fitting out-of-sample model (Model 4.1 in the main paper). This figure plots the out-of-
sample predicted probabilities of a militia being present in a given country in a particular year on 
the x-axis, and the actual observed measure on the y-axis. We plot the text of the three-letter 
country codes and the year of the observation to aid in identification.1 The size of the text is 
proportional to the absolute value of the difference between the actual observation and our 
prediction from the model with the disaggregated indicators (Model 4.1) to allow us to see which 
observations are clear misses and which ones are more accurate.2 In the upper-right hand corner, 
the model predicts cases of militia presence well in India, Iraq, Uganda, China, and the 
Philippines. It also comes close for Libya, Saudi Arabia and Rwanda. The largest errors that 
would lead to false negatives in the forecast appear to be in Russia and Estonia. Similarly, in the 
bottom row, the model accurately predicts the absence of semi-official militias in Gambia, Togo, 
Kuwait, Greece, and Lebanon, among others. However, the model predicts a high probability of 
seeing militias in Colombia and Nigeria in 2005 and Ghana in 2002, when these groups were 
measured as being absent. Although no semi-official militias have been coded for these countries 
during these years, both Colombia and Nigeria had informal militias in 2005, which lack the 
official and recognized status of semi-official militias. While informal militias are often 
associated with governments that have an incentive to avoid accountability and need low-cost 
armed groups that can be mobilized quickly (e.g., Alvarez 2006), we would not expect these 
groups to be used for coup-proofing.  
 
                                                
1 These values are jittered slightly to improve readability. 
2 The small text is needed for the accurate predictions since the model performs quite well and thus there are many 
predictions clustered near zero when militias were observed to be absent, and near one when militias were observed 
to be present. 
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FIG A1: Plot of the out-of-sample predicted probabilities from the disaggregated model (4.1) and the actual values. 
The size of the three-letter country code and year labels is proportional to the absolute distance between the 
predicted and observed values.   
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TABLE A1. Analysis of observing either semi-official or informal militias 
 
 All PGMs All PGMs All PGMs All PGMs All PGMs All PGMs 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 
Variables Coef (SE) Coef (SE) Coef (SE) Coef (SE) Coef (SE) Coef (SE) 
Intercept -0.715 (0.045) -0.921 (0.049) -1.028 (0.054) -1.143  (0.059) -2.133  (0.136) -2.108 (0.140) 
Coup Risk (B+S) 0.208 (0.022)   0.051 (0.028)   -0.052  (0.052)  
Recent Coup   0.726 (0.112)   0.505  (0.124)  -0.064 (0.228) 
Civil War Risk     0.331 (0.018) 0.335  (0.018) 0.267  (0.030) 0.264 (0.030) 
Account. Avoidance     0.172  (0.045) 0.181  (0.044) 0.428  (0.083) 0.412 (0.081) 
      
Time since last PGM obs.    650.3 (8.7) 650 (8.7) 
      
AIC 2960.4 3011.1 2476.2 2463.2 890.7 891.7 
In-sample AUC 0.55 0.53 0.75 0.75 0.92 0.92 
Out-of-Sample AUC 0.55  0.82  0.97 
Out-of-Sample Brier Score 0.20  0.14  0.03 
N 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456 2456 
 
Note. Out-of-sample prediction done with 684 observations from 2001 – 2005. Lower AIC and Brier score are preferred. Higher AUC is preferred. Generalized 
Additive models using logit link function estimated with mgcv in R. Chi-squared test and degrees of freedom (in parentheses) are reported for the splines 
measuring the nonlinear effect of the time since the last PGM observation. 
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TABLE A2. Analysis of either semi-official or informal militias with disaggregated measures 
 
 
 
Note: Out-of-sample prediction done with 684 observations from 2001-2005. Lower AIC and Brier score are 
preferred. Higher AUC is preferred. Generalized Additive models using logit link function estimated with mgcv in 
R. Chi-squared test and degrees of freedom (in parentheses) are reported for the splines measuring the nonlinear 
effect of the time since the last PGM observation. Concept column refers to the indicators from the previous models. 
 
 
TABLE A3. Analysis of semi-official militias, excluding observations with only informal militias 
 
 Model 4 
 Combined Risk 
Variables Coef (SE) 
Intercept -3.495 (0.216) 
Coup Risk (B+S) -0.060 (0.060) 
Civil War Risk 0.216 (0.037) 
Account. Avoidance 0.366  (0.098) 
  
AIC 601.8 
N 2031 
 
Note. Chi-squared test and degrees of freedom (in parentheses) are reported for the splines measuring the nonlinear 
effect of the time since the previous PGM observation. 
  Model 4.1 
Concept Variable Coef. (SE) 
Constant Intercept -11.997 (1.493) 
Coup Recent Coup 0.195 (0.257) 
Civil War Mixed Regime 0.669 (0.221) 
 Development 0.311 (0.153) 
 Population 0.630 (0.086) 
 Non-contiguous Terr. -0.083 (0.204) 
 Ethnic Frac. 0.175 (0.391) 
 Mount. Terrain 0.013 (0.077) 
 Recent Civil War 1.489 (0.308) 
Accountability Avoidance Aid from Democracies 0.180 (0.035) 
 Aid from Autocracies -0.130 (0.032) 
    
Timing Time since last PGM observation 570.8 (8.6) 
    
 AIC 839.0 
 In-sample AUC 0.94 
 Out-of-Sample AUC 0.97 
 Out-of-Sample Brier Score 0.03 
 N 2456 
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In Table A4 we explore whether the process by which semi-official militias are created changed 
after the end of the Cold War. The inclusion of a dummy variable marking the post-1989 time 
period was inconsistent. Regardless of the inclusion of this variable our results were consistent. 
Testing for a structural break in accountability avoidance after the Cold War yielded a lower AIC 
value and an insignificant F-statistic (.57, p-value=.45).  
 
 
TABLE A4. Analyzing the Impact of the Cold War 
 
 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 
Variables Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
Intercept -1.18 (0.08) -1.31 (0.09) 
Coup Risk (B+S) 0.14 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) 
Civil War Risk   0.28 (0.02) 
Account. Avoidance   0.18 (0.05) 
Post Cold War -0.05 (0.10) -0.38 (0.11) 
   
AIC 2567.5 2248.9 
N 2456 2456 
 
 
Next, while we created indicators of civil war risk explicitly to avoid the possibility that the 
creation of militias would, within a given year, make civil war more likely, and thus induce bias 
in our estimates, it is important to check the robustness of our assumption. One way to explore 
this is to recreate our index without the recent civil war measure. This indicator is the most likely 
component to be correlated with sub-annual changes in both militias and civil wars. However, 
we should point out that the assumption that militias make civil wars independently more likely 
within a given year relies on the assumption that leaders either do not know this, or want to bring 
about their own demise, which we find unlikely. Regardless, we believe checking the robustness 
of our civil war risk indicator to this change is useful. Table A5 is thus reassuring. In all cases, 
the use of a civil war index that does not include previous civil wars as an indicator leads to the 
identical inferences as those reported in the main text. 
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TABLE A5. Dropping recent civil war from civil war risk measure 
 
 Model 6.1 Model 6.2 Model 6.3 Model 6.3 
Variables Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
Intercept -1.44 (0.06) -1.49 (0.06) -3.12 (0.17) -2.12 (0.14) 
Coup Risk (B+S) 0.03 (0.03)   -0.07 (0.06)   
Recent Coup   0.20 (0.13)   -0.06 (0.23) 
Modified Civil War Risk 0.24 (0.02) 0.24 (0.02) 0.23 (0.04) 0.26 (0.03) 
Account. Avoidance 0.20 (0.05) 0.121 (0.05) 0.43 (0.09) 0.45 (0.08) 
     
Time since last PGM observation  7.46 (8.40) 8.05 (8.74) 
     
AIC 2367.2 2365.7 786.23 911.29 
N 2456 2456 2456 2456 
 
Note. Chi-squared test and degrees of freedom (in parentheses) are reported for the splines measuring the nonlinear 
effect of the time since the previous PGM observation. 
 
 
To probe whether our variables are simply measuring either time-constant regional variation in 
militia propensity or episodic cross-sectional shocks in a given year, as opposed to our indicators 
of interest, we ran models with regional and then yearly fixed effects. Nine regions were coded 
based on the Correlates of War definitions.3 These results are included in Table A6. 
 
 
TABLE A6. Including regional and yearly fixed effects 
 
 Model 7.1 Model 7.2 
 Regional fixed effects Yearly fixed effects 
Variables Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
Intercept -2.86 (0.20) -1.43 (0.25) 
Coup Risk (B+S) 0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.03) 
Civil War Risk 0.29 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02) 
Account. Avoidance 0.22 (0.05) 0.18 (0.05) 
   
AIC 1995.1 2273.7 
N 2456 2456 
 
 
 
                                                
3 The assignment of states to regions can be found here: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/Development/regions.htm. 
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Finally, we re-estimate our Model 3.3 from Table 3 the main text, but using lagged values of 
each index. We find the same substantive results, shown in Table A7. 
 
 
TABLE A7. Using lagged indices 
 
 Model 8.1 
Variables Coef. (SE) 
Intercept -2.77 (0.14) 
Coup Risk (B+S)t-1 -0.06 (0.05) 
Civil War Risk t-1 0.24 (0.03) 
Account. Avoidance t-1 0.21 (0.08) 
  
AIC 909.9 
N 2455 
 
 
 
